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Speaking in Code
Bernstein v. United States Department of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal.
1996); Bernstein v. United States Department of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279
(N.D. Cal. 1996).
For centuries, generals have spoken in code to disguise their
communications.' Today, computer programmers utilize code as well.
Encryption computer programs are written in source code, the text of a
computer program written in a high-level computer language. While no one
has challenged the right of military leaders to use code, there is a constitutional
question as to whether computer programmers have a First Amendment right
to speak in cryptographic computer source code. Recently, District Judge
Marilyn Hall Patel held in Bernstein v. United States Department of State3 that
cryptographic computer source code is "pure speech" and thus entitled to the
full protection of the First Amendment.4
Much effort has been spent on the administrative regulations concerning
the export of encryption technology. Yet very little has been written on
whether computer source code is "pure speech" subject to the full protection
of the First Amendment, "expressive conduct" to be regulated by the standard
1. Cryptography is the art and science of keeping messages secure. while encryption is the -process
of disguising a message in such a way as to hide its substance." BRUCE ScHNEIER. APPLIED
CRYPTOGRAPHY 1 (1994).
2. See Charles H. Davidson, Object Program, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPt'ER SctEscE 962 (Anthony
Ralston & Edwin D. Reilly eds., 3d ed. 1993); see also Bernstein v. United States Dcp't of State. 922 F
Supp. 1426, 1429 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("High-level (computer] languages are closer to natural language
than low-level languages which direct the functioning of the computer.") (citation omitted).
3. 922 F. Supp. 1426 (denying government's motion to dismiss and holding that cryptographic
computer source code is speech protected by First Amendment and constitutional challenges to statute and
regulations are justiciable); Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State. 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(holding on cross-motions for summary judgment that: (1) licensing requirements for speech relating to
computer encryption software are unconstitutional prior restraints; (2) definitions of certain terms in
International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) are not vague; (3) exemptions from term -technical data"
for academic items are impermissibly vague; (4) term "export" is not vague; and (5) neither ITAR scheme
as whole nor definition of export are overbroad).
4. See Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1436; see also Bernstein. 945 F. Supp. at 1287
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set forth in United States v. O'Brien5 or simply "pure conduct," and therefore
outside the protection of the First Amendment. In Bernstein, Judge Patel found
that "even if Snuffle source code, which is easily compiled into object code for
the computer to read and easily used for encryption is essentially functional,
that does not remove it from the realm of speech."6 This Case Note will argue
that Bernstein improperly categorized cryptographic computer source code as
speech, when it is simply pure conduct not entitled to any First Amendment
protection.7
Bernstein arose out of a dispute between Daniel Bernstein and the State
Department over the export of Bernstein's encryption system, "Snuffle 5.0. '
Snuffle 5.0 is the source code for an encryption system written in "C," a high-
level computer programming language.9 When source code is converted into
object code-a binary system consisting of a series of O's and 1 's-a computer
can encrypt and decrypt information." Nearly unbreakable encoding
technology, such as Snuffle 5.0, is becoming more available and affordable,
and law enforcement agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation are
finding it much more difficult to employ old methods of surveillance. Such
methods, including wiretapping, are increasingly obsolete in a digital
5. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien held that
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the government
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
Id. at 377.
6. Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1435.
7. The only other case to consider the First Amendment implications of cryptographic computer source
code is Karn v. United States Department of State, 925 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1996). In deciding the summary
judgment motion, the court assumed that the protection of the First Amendment extended to the source code
and the comments on the plaintiff's diskette. See id. at 9 (footnotes omitted). However, lending credence
to the argument that cryptographic computer source code alone is not speech protected by the First
Amendment, Judge Charles Richey stated that "[t]he Court makes no ruling as to whether source codes,
without the comments, fall within the protection of the First Amendment. Source codes are merely a means
of commanding a computer to perform a function." Id. at 10 n.19 (emphasis added). The D.C. Circuit
remanded the case in light of an Executive Order transferring regulatory authority over nonmilitary
cryptographic computer source code to the Commerce Department. See Kam v. United States Dep't of
State, No. 96-5121, 1997 WL 71750, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 1997).
Finding that cryptographic computer source code by itself is not protected by the First Amendment
does not mean that all matters related to source code and encryption programs are without a constitutional
shield. This Case Note will not examine the more complex question of whether other potentially regulated
matters are protected by the First Amendment. Some of these potentially regulated matters are: (1) the
encrypted message itself; (2) the algorithm; (3) specific instructions for programming a computer to encrypt
and decrypt using this algorithm; (4) general descriptions of how to use the algorithm; and (5) scientific
writings concerning the encryption system as a whole. Some of the matters above are clearly protected by
the First Amendment as "pure speech." Others may fall into a category I term "byte speech," composed
of language or expression unique to digital communications. Byte speech would include forms of protected
First Amendment expression ranging from "pure speech" to "symbolic speech." A discussion of the extent
of such protection, however, is outside the scope of this Case Note.
8. See Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1429. Snuffle 5.0 consists of "Snuffle.c," the encryption component,
and "Unsnuffle.c," its decryption counterpart. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
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communication age.
Bernstein submitted Snuffle 5.0-in C language source files-and his
academic paper describing the Snuffle system to the Office of Defense Trade
Controls (ODTC) to ascertain whether his work needed to be licensed for
commercial export.'" ODTC determined that "Snuffle 5.0 was a defense
article under Category XIII of ITAR [International Traffic in Arms
Regulations] and subject to licensing by the Department of State prior to
export."' 2 Thereafter, Bernstein sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against enforcement of the ITAR and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA),
which regulates the import and export of defense articles. 3 Bernstein argued
that "the First Amendment ... includes the right to speak confidentially, and
thus, encryption is deserving of protection because it facilitates private
communications."' 4 Although the court's holding in Bernstein was not this
broad, Judge Patel did hold that source code was speech. 5 Judge Patel had
previously held that "'[lI]anguage is by definition speech, and the regulation of
any language is the regulation of speech' ..... This court can find no
meaningful difference between computer language, particularly high-level
languages ... and German or French."'"
11. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. §§ 2778-96 (1994 & Supp 1996), authorizes
the President to regulate the import and export of "defense articles" by designating such items on the
United States Munitions List (USML). See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1994). Once placed on the USML, and
unless otherwise exempted, a defense article requires a license before it can be imported or exported- See
id. § 2778(b)(2). Types of items covered by the USML are listed at 22 C.ER. § 121.1. Category XIII.
Auxiliary Military Equipment, includes "[clryptographic (including key management) systems, equipment,
assemblies, modules, integrated circuits, components or software with the capability of maintaining secrecy
or confidentiality of information systems." Id. § 121.1 Category XHII(b)(I).
The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.FR. §§ 120-30 (1996), authorizes the
Secretary of State pursuant to an executive order to enforce the AECA. The ITAR is admintstered within
the State Department by the Office of Defense Trade Controls. Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs The
ITAR prescribes a "commodity jurisdiction procedure" by which the ODTC determines if an article is
covered by the USML when doubt exists. See id. § 120.4(a).
12. Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1430. After the first ODTC determination, Bernstein submitted a second
request asking for a separate determination for each of five items: The Snuffle Encryption System (an
academic paper), Snuffle.c, Unsnuffle.c, a description in English of how to use Snuffle 5 0. and instructions
in English for programming a computer to use Snuffle 5.0. See id. After the plaintiff initiated this action.
the ODTC concluded that only Snuffle.c and Unsnuffle.c were defense articles. See id.
13. See id. at 1428. In response to allegations by critics that these federal regulations serve only to
handicap American companies, because domestic companies are forced to limit the encryption capablities
of their products if they hope to export them for sale overseas, President Clinton issued Executive Order
13,026, 1996 WL 666563 (Nov. 15, 1996), which recognizes that foreign products with comparable or
greater encryption capabilities than American products currently exist. See id. (establishing that "the
Secretary of Commerce ('Secretary') may, in his discretion, consider the foreign availability of comparable
encryption products in determining whether to issue a license in a particular case or to remove controls on
particular products"). Under the new guidelines, companies would be able to sell more sophisticated
encryption technology, provided that they devise and submit a plan to the Commerce Department "outhnng
how they would ensure that law enforcement officers would be able to *recover,' or unscramble. encrypted
information." Elizabeth Corcoran, U.S. to Ease Encryption Restrictions: Privacy Advocates Vary of
Proposal for Software Exports, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1996, at Al.
14. Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1287 (N.D Cal 1996)_
15. See id.
16. Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1435 (quoting Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English. 69 F3d 920,
935 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), vacated as moor, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997)).
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The First Amendment prohibits governmental bodies from enacting laws
abridging the freedom of speech. The category of speech receiving the most
protection is "pure speech." "Pure speech" includes ideas expressed verbally
and ideas communicated through the written word. 7 For example, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently stated that the decision to "speak in
a language other than English [implicates] pure speech concerns .... Speech
in any language is still speech, and the decision to speak in another language
is a decision involving speech alone."' 8 However, for expression to be termed
pure speech, the form of its expression must be relatively pure. For example,
courts have held that picketing is "not an instance of 'pure speech' because it
usually involves conduct of some sort and may not include verbal utterances
at all."19
Examining the relevant case law, it is clear that the Snuffle source code
is not "pure speech" protected by the First Amendment. Indeed, computer
source code differs from natural language in two significant respects. First, it
is not possible to employ source code without the use of special equipment.
Without a computer, source code is simply an array of symbols, letters, and
numbers. With the addition of a computer, the source code allows the
computer to monitor and control application programs running on the
computer, to read other programs, and to manage data.20 While it is true that
all forms of expression-except those that are live, oral, and unmodified by
amplification or other means-sometimes employ equipment (even if that
equipment is as simple as a pen or pencil), source code cannot function
without a computer. English, French, German, and other natural languages can
stand apart from equipment such as a pen or pencil, but computer source code
cannot.
Second, it is not possible to create communications, thoughts, or ideas in
cryptographic computer source code. Instead, it is only possible to use source
code to translate these events into and out of an encrypted message. It is the
ability to create thoughts or ideas in a language that gives rise to culture.2'
While some may argue that computer source code is no different from
languages such as Braille or American Sign Language (ASL), which are
17. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) ("The First Amendment literally forbids the
abridgment only of 'speech,' but we have long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken
or written word.").
18. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 936.
19. Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339, 1343 (7th Cir. 1986), vacated and reh'g granted, 818 F.2d 1284
(7th Cir.), aff'd en banc by an equally divided court, 822 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds
and remanded, 487 U.S. 474, vacated prior judgment and rev'd and remanded, 857 F.2d 1175 (7th Cir.
1988), aff'd, 877 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1989).
20. See Todd Shuster, Originality in Computer Programs and Expert Systems, 5 TRANSNAT'L LAW.
1, 12 (1992).
21. See Michele Belluzzi, Comment, Cultural Protection as a Rationale for Legislation, 14 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 127, 129 (1995) ("It is only through language that individuals discover their true personality and
develop ideas, skills, and customs necessary to function in society.").
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translating mechanisms, there is an extraordinary difference between these
languages and computer source code. Braille and ASL serve to support a
culture for the deaf and the hearing-impaired. 22 No such claim can be made
on behalf of computer source code.
Is cryptographic computer source code "symbolic speech" protected by the
First Amendment? In Spence v. Washington,' the Supreme Court set forth
a two-part test for determining whether conduct is "sufficiently imbued with
elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First...
Amendment[]." The Court held that for an activity to be deemed expressive
conduct, "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message [must have been]
present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it." - However, in Hurley
v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,2 the Court
stated that "a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a
'particularized message,' would never reach the unquestionably shielded
painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schbnberg, or Jabberwocky verse
of Lewis Carroll."27 As a result, courts have looked to another portion of
Spence that examines "the nature of [the] activity, combined with the factual
context and environment in which it was undertaken" ' to determine whether
the activity has enough communicative elements to receive protection under the
First Amendment.29
Applying this test to cryptographic computer source code is difficult, but
not impossible. In cases where government regulations of expressive conduct
have been struck down, the communicative intent of the actor was clear and
"closely akin to pure speech. '30 Examining the nature of the source code, the
factual context, and the environment in which it is undertaken, makes clear that
source code is not sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall
within the scope of the First Amendment. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
22. Although encrypted speech may be analogous to Braille, source code itself is as much speech as
a printing press designed to print Braille.
23. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam).
24. Id. at 409. The Supreme Court has recognized the expressive nature of many activities See Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (recognizing expressive nature of desecrating American flag to protest
renomination of Ronald Reagan for President); Schact v. United States, 398 U S 58 (1970) (recognizng
expressive nature of wearing American military uniforms in dramatic presentaton criticizing Vietnam War):
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503. 505-06 (1969) (recognizing expressive
nature of students' wearing of black armbands to protest Vietnam war); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U S. 131.
141-42 (1966) (recognizing expressive nature of sit-in by African Americans in segregated library).
25. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
26. 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
27. Id. at 2345 (citation omitted).
28. Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-10.
29. See id.
30. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.. 393 U S 503. 505-06 (1969)
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Community School District,3' Spence, and Texas v. Johnson,32 the expressive
nature of the particular activities was relatively clear. In Tinker, the donning
of a black armband in a school "conveyed an unmistakable message about a
contemporaneous issue of intense public concern-the Vietnam hostilities. 33
In Spence, the upside-down display of an American flag with a peace sign
taped on it "was roughly simultaneous with and concededly triggered by the
Cambodian incursion and the Kent State tragedy."34 In Johnson, the American
flag was desecrated while President Ronald Reagan was nearby being
renominated for the Presidency, and the "overtly political nature of this
conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent. 35
In the case of source code, the expressive nature of the conduct is far from
intentional and overwhelmingly apparent. If source code, by itself, intends to
communicate a right to speak confidentially, then its current form of numbers,
letters, and symbols is not likely to aid in that endeavor. Neither is it likely
that an average viewer would discern any element of communication in source
code espousing a desire for confidential communications. Perhaps the only
factual context and environment in which a viewer would be able to
understand the expressive nature of encryption is the dark recesses of a
computer laboratory. Yet this is not the factual scenario in Bernstein, for
Daniel Bernstein sought permission for the general export of his source code.
It is doubtful that a general audience will comprehend the expressive nature of
cryptographic computer source code.
There is no First Amendment right to speak in cryptographic computer
source code. Computer source code is neither "pure speech" nor expressive
conduct. Instead, it is "pure conduct" that is not sufficiently imbued with
elements of communication to receive First Amendment protection. On
viewing cryptographic computer source code, an average viewer would be hard
pressed to ascertain an intent to convey a message or belief, or discern any
form of a readily recognizable message. Yet although computer source code
is not protected under the First Amendment, other forms of digital
communications may be protected. For instance, courts may conclude that the
encrypted message itself or ready-to-use software deserves such protection.
Source code, however, merits no such protection.
-John P Collins, Jr
31. Id.
32. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
33. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410.
34. Id.
35. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406.
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The First Amendment and Murder Manuals
Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996).
On March 3, 1993, James Perry brutally murdered Mildred Horn, her
quadriplegic son, and his nurse. Perry closely followed twenty-two instructions
on how to plan and execute such murders, provided in graphic and explicit
detail by two books he purchased from Paladin Enterprises: How to Make a
Disposable Silencer, Vol. II and Hit Man: A Technical Manual for
Independent Contractors.2 Following Perry's conviction and death sentence
for the triple murder, the families of the victims sued Paladin for tortious
aiding and abetting and negligence. For purposes of summary judgment,
Paladin stipulated that it had intentionally marketed its books to ex-convicts
and would-be criminals, knowing full well that many would rely on the
detailed step-by-step instructions therein to commit heinous murders.'
Although the district court found the books to be "reprehensible and devoid of
any significant redeeming social value," 5 it nevertheless held that, under
Brandenburg v. Ohio,6 the First Amendment barred recovery of damages.7
1. 2 How TO MAKE A DIsPOsABLE SILENCER (Paladin Enters. 1983).
2. REX FERAL, Hrr MAN: A TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS (Paladin Enters.
1983). For example, Perry meticulously followed the books' directions and advice about how to solicit for
prospective clients in need of murder-for-hire services, how to handle an AR-7 rifle and drill out the serial
number, how to construct a silencer and shoot at an optimal distance to "insure quick and sure death." how
to disassemble the weapon and change its rifling to prevent its ballistics from matching the bullets left
behind in the victims, how to make the crime scene look like a burglary. and how to use a rental car to
get away from the crime scene undetected. See Rice v. Paladin Enters.. Inc.. 940 F. Supp. 836, 839-40 (D
Md. 1996).
3. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838. The plaintiffs also sought damages based on theories of civil conspiracy
and strict liability. Id.
4. See id. at 840. The parties acknowledged that Paladin's target audience also included authors who
write books about crime and criminals, law enforcement officers and agencies, persons who read about
methods for committing crimes for entertainment, persons who fantasize about committing crimes but do
not commit them, and criminologists and others who study criminal methods and psychology. See td.
5. Id. at 849.
6. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
7. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 848-49. The district court also held that Maryland tort law does not
extend far enough to support a claim of aider and abettor tort liability in this context. See id. at 842. Since
the Maryland Supreme Court has expressly recognized that '[al person may be held liable as a
principal ... if he, by any means (words, signs, or motions) encouraged, incited, aided or abetted the act
of the direct perpetrator of the tort,"' Alleco, Inc. v. Weinberg Found.. Inc., 665 A.2d 1038, 1049 (Md.
1995) (quoting Duke v. Feldman, 226 A.2d 345, 347 (Md. 1967)) (emphasis added), it is not altogether
clear why the district court declined to apply this precedent in Rice. Furthermore, if the district court was
correct in declining to apply aider and abettor tort liability, it is unclear why the court ever reached the First
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The question posed by this case is significant in light of recent state8 and
federal9 legislation designed to curb the distribution, especially via the
Internet, of instructional information about bomb-making and the construction
of other dangerous weapons. I argue in this Case Note that government
regulation of speech that provides these kinds of detailed, step-by-step
instructions about how to commit violent felonies should be considered
presumptively constitutional.
II
Scholars and jurists have relied on a number of theories to explain the
value of free speech. The marketplace of ideas theory rests on the notion that
free speech leads to the ascertainment of truth and that the best way to
convince people of the falsehood of ideas is not by suppressing speech, but by
encouraging more of it.'0 The Meiklejohnian theory of free speech places
more emphasis on free speech as a means to public deliberation and a well-
informed electorate, essential to democratic self-governance." The libertarian
model values free speech as an end in and of itself, viewing people as
autonomous and rational decisionmakers, with a right to control their own
thoughts and beliefs without government interference or manipulation.'
2
Essentially, all of these theories are "designed to guard against the danger that
Amendment issues. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (advocating that laws be construed to avoid constitutional questions).
8. The Georgia Code, for example, makes it a felony for any person to
[t]each, train, or demonstrate to any other person the use, application, or making of any illegal
firearm, dangerous weapon, or incendiary device capable of causing injury or death to persons
either directly or through a writing or over or through a computer or computer network if the
person teaching, training, or demonstrating knows, has reason to know, or intends that such
teaching, training, or demonstrating will be unlawfully employed for use in or in furtherance
of a civil disorder, riot or insurrection.
GA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 11, § 151(b)(1) (amended 1995). This statute would cover the speech in Rice, but
may be overbroad. The phrase "civil disorder, riot or insurrection" may or may not involve danger to the
lives and safety of other people. For example, the term "civil disorder" could encompass peaceable
assemblies like sit-ins or strikes. Moreover, the phrase "to teach, train, or demonstrate" encompasses a wide
variety of speech that may extend far beyond the kind of step-by-step, manual-like instructional speech
found in Rice.
9. The Department of Defense Authorization Act, already passed by the Senate, would prohibit the
distribution of information relating to the manufacture of explosive materials for a criminal purpose. See
S. 1762, 106th Cong. § 1088(a)(1) (1997).
10. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.");
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[TJhe best test of truth Is the
power of the thought to get accepted in the competition of the market.").
I1. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The protection given speech and press
was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people."); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJoHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948).
12. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978) ("The individual's interest
in self-expression is a concern of the First Amendment separate from the concern for open and informed
discussion."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those who won
our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties.").
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the government is only pretending to be concerned about noise, litter,
offensiveness, or a hostile audience reaction but in fact is reacting to the feared
persuasiveness of the speech that it seeks to suppress."' 3 The First
Amendment prevents the government from stifling dissident political views by
resorting to pretextual allegations that such speech will cause harm or
violence. 4
Brandenburg v. Ohio provides a paradigmatic example of the use of such
pretext by the government. In that case, a Ku Klux Klan leader was prosecuted
for making a reference to possible future lawlessness in a speech before a
number of Klan members. The Court recognized that the then-predominant
clear and present danger test' 5 allowed the government to suppress
undesirable political views simply by invoking the speech's "tendency to lead
to violence."' 6 In order to ensure greater protection of political speech and
less opportunity for government pretext, the Brandenburg Court abandoned the
manipulable "danger" test and replaced it with a new rule: The state cannot
proscribe speech that it alleges could or will lead to lawlessness unless such
speech was "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
[was] likely to incite or produce such action."' 7
The Brandenburg test was obviously intended to make it more difficult for
the government to restrict or suppress political speech. It did not, however,
establish an absolute bar to government regulation. Rather, it created a strong
presumption that the First Amendment protects the mere advocacy of
lawlessness. It implicitly assumes that government fears of erupting violence,
even if not pretextual, are usually exaggerated, and that the balance of interests
therefore favors protecting individuals' self-expression.
This presumption, however, is inverted when the advocacy in question is
directed to producing imminent violence and is likely to produce such
violence." The question, of course, is: why? Why is state regulation of
13. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Erpression, 91 COUTM. L REV 334,
338 (1991); see also CASs R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREEF. SPEECH 134 (1993)
("Government is rightly distrusted when it is regulating speech that might harm its own interests; and when
the speech at issue is political, its own interests are almost always at stake.").
14. See Strauss, supra note 13, at 337 ("ITlyrants suppress speech because they fear it will be
persuasive.").
15. The clear and present danger test was first articulated in Schenk v. United States. 249 U . 47
(1919), and was subsequently relied upon to uphold government suppression of political speech on a
number of occasions, see, e.g., Dennis v. United States. 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding conviction of
members of Communist Party, which advocated violent overthrow of federal government); IVhuney. 274
U.S. 357 (upholding conviction of member of state Communist Labor Party, which advocated criminal
syndicalism); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (upholding conviction of Socialist Party
presidential candidate for antiwar speech).
16. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973).
17. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
18. Although the Brandenburg test speaks only of "lawlessness,'" many cases use the terms lawlessness
and violence interchangeably. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.. 458 U S. 886. 9M--28 (1982)
(using the terms lawlessness and violence interchangeably); Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U S. 441,
448 (1974) (same); Hess, 414 U.S at 109 (same); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council. Inc. v.
Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 183-84 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (same); Noto v. United States, 367 U S.
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speech that incites imminent lawlessness presumptively valid? After all,
restricting speech because of its communicative impact, even speech directed
to inciting imminent lawlessness, still implicates certain core First Amendment
values such as self-expression and listener autonomy.'9 Regulating such
speech might also curtail public deliberation and limit the quantity of speech
disseminated in the marketplace.
The answer lies in the Court's general suspicion of government motives.
While the Brandenburg test clearly recognizes the government's compelling
interest in safeguarding the safety of citizens, it generally suspects the
government's invocation of this interest when the speech in question involves
dissident political views.20 Thus, the requirement that the alleged lawlessness
take place or be likely to take place almost immediately after the delivery of
the speech is an attempt to ensure that the danger is in fact not speculative and
that the government's interest in preventing the violence is not pretextual.
III
Although the Rice court was correct in holding that under the Brandenburg
test, Paladin could not be held liable,2' the First Amendment does not require
such broad protection of instructional speech. Government regulation of the
narrow category of speech at issue in Rice-technical, detailed, step-by-step,
do-it-yourself manuals--ought to be considered presumptively constitutional.
Like other "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech"22 that are
290, 297-98 (1961) (same).
19. People presumably still have an interest in making up their own minds to act without interference
from a paternalistic government.
20. Another possible explanation is that incitement to imminent lawlessness, like fighting words,
induces listeners to react impulsively. Under this theory, regulating such speech would therefore not
implicate the listeners' autonomy. See Strauss, supra note 13, at 338-40, 366-68 (arguing that government
regulation of speech that persuades rational decisionmakers to act violates individual autonomy and the First
Amendment, but that regulation of speech that induces ill-considered actions is not a deprivation of
autonomy). The problem with this theory is that the Brandenburg test does not hinge on the persuasiveness
vel non of the speech. That is, it is irrelevant whether an audience is about to act lawlessly because It is
reacting irrationally or because it is acting rationally and deliberately. As long as the speaker directs her
speech to producing imminent lawlessness, and as long as such action is likely, the government's interest
in protecting against such violence outweighs whatever social value the speech may have.
21. Applying Brandenburg's holding to the facts in Rice, the district court properly found that the
Paladin publications did not meet the stringent imminence requirement, as the murders occurred at least
a year after Perry purchased the manuals. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., 940 F. Supp 836, 847 (D. Md. 1996).
The district court also found that the publications did not incite readers to lawlessness. However, the speech
did implicitly invite such action. For a reader without the knowledge or confidence to act on his resolve,
a detailed roadmap not only provides information needed to commit the crime, but also functions to
instruct, reassure, and encourage the actor to follow through on his intent. Despite the books' disclaimers
that it is against the law to manufacture silencers and that the information provided is for informational
purposes only, see id. at 839-40, the detailed photographs and step-by-step instructions about how to
construct such weapons and how effectively to utilize them to commit murders suggest that these
disclaimers were not meant to be heeded. Like other instruction manuals, the instructions were presumably
set forth to aid readers interested in following and implementing them.
22. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
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not accorded First Amendment protection, such as obscenity2 and incitement
to imminent lawless action,24 this category of speech only minimally
implicates the values at the heart of the First Amendment. More importantly,
like other categories of unprotected speech, this category is particularly likely
to result in severe harms to innocent third parties. In the general calculus of
competing interests, the government's interest in protecting the lives and limbs
of its citizens outweighs whatever slight social value inheres in such speech.
Additionally, the risk that the government will regulate such speech in order
to curtail undesireable political viewpoints is de mininis.
First, it is highly probable, if not certain, that detailed, graphic instructional
speech will aid and abet some readers in effectively carrying out violent
felonies. As with other do-it-yourself manuals, it is highly foreseeable that
some readers will-yes--do it themselves and follow the instructions provided.
Although it may not lead to imminent lawlessness, such speech poses a danger
that is far from speculative in terms of either its nature or its likelihood. The
state clearly has a very strong interest in safeguarding the lives of its
citizens. 5
Second, because step-by-step, instructional speech is highly clinical and
technical, it has little if any expressive value, and because it advocates the
commission of garden-variety felonies, it has little if any political or otherwise
socially redeeming value. As a category of speech, therefore, it is particularly
dangerous and not particularly valuable. Restricting such speech might still
implicate certain values like speaker and listener autonomy, but the state's
interest in protecting the lives of citizens outweighs whatever value inheres in
permitting access to detailed information about criminal methods.'
Finally, instructional speech like the kind found in Rice is easily
distinguishable from general advocacy, description, opinion, or political speech.
For example, speech that provides instructions on how to blow up buildings
or commit murder, torture, or rape falls well within this exception. As with the
obscenity standard, which requires that there be an absence of serious literary,
23. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (reaffirming the unprotected status of
obscenity).
24. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (permitting government regulation of speech
directed to inciting imminent violence and likely to produce such violence).
25. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97. 103 (1979) (noting that state may not
punish publication of lawfully obtained truthful information "absent a need to further a state interest of the
highest order"); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665. 700 (1972) (noting that government has compelling
interest in securing safety of persons and property of citizens); Herceg v. Hustler Magazine. Inc.. 814 F.2d
1017, 1028-29 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J., dissenting) ('The interest in protecting life is recognized
specifically for first amendment purposes and, analytically can be no less important than the interest in
reputation... [P]rotect[ing] society from loss of life and limb. [isl a legitimate, indeed, compelhng. state
interest.").
26. See, e.g., KENT GREENWALT, SPEEcH, CRi IEs. & THE UsEs oF LANGUAGE 115 (1989) (arguing
that "considerations of autonomy matter, and the autonomy of speaker and of audience are reasons to
permit encouragements to crime, but they are reasons to be considered in relation to other reasons, not
absolutely decisive counters in favor of liberty").
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artistic, political, or scientific value,27 inserting into such publications a few
lines from Shakespeare or The Federalist Papers will not change the nature of
the speech as a whole.' While other kinds of speech might also endanger the
bodily integrity and safety of innocent people and possess little political or
social value, such speech is often difficult to categorize, and its regulation is
therefore much more susceptible to manipulation by the government or the
courts. Judges and juries, however, can easily tell that the speech before them
is instructional: It is either a manual, like the kind one uses to set up a VCR,
or it is not. It either instructs how to commit violent felonies or it does not. 9
The adoption of this exception would implicate none of the major concerns
of Brandenburg and its progeny. On the one hand, there is little danger that
the state's invocation of harm or lawlessness would be a pretext for quashing
political dissent. As with the imminence standard in Brandenburg, this
exception to otherwise protected speech ensures that the reason for restricting
speech is to protect citizens from real harm, and not to suppress open and
robust public debate. Moreover, the repercussions of instructional speech of the
sort found in Rice are so foreseeable, and so severe, that the danger is quite
real, even if not technically imminent. On the other hand, the speech itself has
little, if any, socially redeeming value, politically, artistically, or otherwise. In
cases like Rice, "society's interest in compensating injured parties [and] the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment,"3 are not
incompatible goals.
-Avital T Zer-Ilan
27. See, e.g., Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
28. See id. at 25 n.7 ("'A quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will not constitutionally
redeem an otherwise obscene publication .. .") (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972)).
29. Of course, this test only establishes a presumption that instructional speech about how to commit
violent felonies is unprotected. When instructional speech has significant political value, the presumption
may be overcome. For example, the speech in United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D.
Wis. 1979), involving the publication of an article about building hydrogen bombs, might have warranted
more First Amendment protection than was actually extended to it, since its principal purpose was to "alert
the people of this country to the false illusion of security created by the government's futile efforts at
secrecy." Id. at 994. This case, however, is distinguishable from Rice not just in terms of the political
nature of the messages. Unlike Rice, Progressive was a prior-restraint case, and therefore required the
government to prove the likelihood of direct, immediate, and irreparable injury to national security. See id.
at 1000. Furthermore, the Progressive court found that the article in question did not "provide a 'do-it-
yourself' guide for the hydrogen bomb." Id. at 993.
30. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 840 (D. Md. 1996).
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